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Abstract
Deep learning has come a long way and has enjoyed an unprecedented success.
Despite high accuracy, however, deep models are brittle and are easily fooled
by imperceptible adversarial perturbations. In contrast to common inference-
time attacks, Backdoor (a.k.a. Trojan) attacks target the training phase of model
construction, and are extremely difficult to combat since a) the model behaves
normally on a pristine testing set and b) the augmented perturbations can be minute
and may only affect few training samples. Here, I propose a new method to tell
whether a model has been subject to a backdoor attack. The idea is to generate
adversarial examples, targeted or untargeted, using conventional attacks such as
FGSM and then feed them back to the classifier. By computing the statistics (here
simply mean maps) of the images in different categories and comparing them with
the statistics of a reference model, it is possible to visually locate the perturbed
regions and unveil the attack.
1 Introduction
Figure 1: An example image (left) after ten (middle) and fifty (right) iterations of DeepDream, using
a network trained to perceive dogs. Figure from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DeepDream.
Adversarial examples are crafted to fool deep learning models [1, 2], and by that virtue they are
deemed undesirable. How can they be useful then? Well, they somehow have been indirectly utilized
in the past. Propagating the loss with respect to the input, instead of the weights, has been used in
several related but seemingly different applications including DeepDream2 (Fig. 1), Style transfer [3],
feature visualization [4, 5], and adversarial attacks [2]. Here, I will show how this technique can be
used to unveil interference in a classifier by means of poisoning attacks [6]. In other words, I am
proposing a simple defense against backdoor poisoning attacks. I will provide minimal experiments
to prove the concept. Further experiments, however, are needed to scale up this approach over more
complex datasets.
Two types of adversarial attacks are common against deep learning models, evasion and poisoning.
In evasion attacks, the adversary applies an imperceptible perturbation, digital or physical, to the
input image in order to fool the classifier (e.g. [1, 2]). The perturbation can be untargeted (changing
the decision to any output other than the true class label) or targeted (changing the decision to a class
of interest), black-box (when only available information is the output labels or scores) or white box
∗Code is available at: https://github.com/aliborji/Backdoor_defense.git
2https://ai.googleblog.com/2015/07/deepdream-code-example-for-visualizing.html
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Figure 2: Each of the four panels represents a backdoor poisoning attack over MNIST. A sample
image and its corresponding patch-augmented image, confusion matrices over the pristine testing
dataset and the poisoned dataset (a patch added to all digits of one class), as well as the average digit
maps are shown.
(some information such as model architecture or gradients are available). The goal in poisoning
attacks (e.g. [7–11]) is to either a) introduce infected samples with wrong labels to the training set to
degrade the testing accuracy of the model (a.k.a. collision attacks) or b) introduce a trigger (e.g. a
sticker) during training such that activating the trigger at testing time will initiate a malfunction in the
system (a.k.a. backdoor attacks). Here, I am concerned with backdoor poisoning attacks.
The problem statement is as follows. Given a model, and possibly a reference model that is supposed
to be used solely for fine tuning (e.g. a backbone), is it possible to tell whether the model contains a
backdoor attack? The approach I take here is based on the idea that adversarial examples generated
for an attacked model would be different than those generated for a clean reference model. In what
follows I will explain how we can tap into such differences to discover anomalies.
2 Approach
To diagnose the attack, first we need to generate adversarial examples. We can feed three types of
inputs to the model a) Blank image, b) White noise, c) (Unlabeled) Data, and then use an inference-
time adversarial attack method (here FGSM [2]) to craft adversarial examples:
xadv ← clip(x− × sign(∇xJ(θ,x, ytarget))) (1)
Here, x is the input image and ytarget is the target class we wish the input to be classified as, and
 ∈ [0, 1] controls the magnitude of perturbation. Notice that the attack does not necessarily need
to be targeted. In practice, I apply the FGSM for a number of iterations akin to IFGSM [12]. Then,
the average of all adversarial examples that are classified as a certain class is computed (Algorithm
I). The same procedure is repeated for the clean reference model. As will be shown later, over
simple datasets such as MNIST, visual inspection of the average adversarial images (also called bias
maps) is enough to discover the attack. Over more complex datasets such as CIFAR, however, more
sophisticated quantitative methods such as outlier detection might be necessary.
Algorithm I:
for target in categories:
2
for a number of samples:
generate x_adv according to Eq. 1
prediction <-- model(x_{adv})
record x_{adv} under prediction
end for
end for
While the above method is effective, it is not granular enough to reveal all categories that are impacted.
To address this, we can perturb images such that they are more likely to belong to the target category
and less likely to belong to the source3 category:
xadv ← clip(x− × sign(∇x(J(θ,x, ytarget)− J(θ,x, ysource)))) (2)
For each pair of categories (except when source=target), a number of adversarial examples are
generated. The average of adversarial images for each pair is then computed. To be a bit more precise:
Algorithm II:
for source in categories:
for target in categories:
if source == target: continue
for a number of samples:
generate x_adv according to Eq. 2
prediction <-- model(x_{adv})
record x_{adv} under (source, prediction)
end for
end for
end for
3 Experiments and Results
Experiments are conducted over the MNIST dataset. In each experiment, first a CNN (Fig. 23) is
trained over the pristine data (called clean model in Figures). Then, an adversarial patch is added to
2000 randomly selected images from the source category and their labels are changed to the target
category (e.g. 8 → 9). The remaining images from the source category preserve their labels. The
CNN is then fine-tuned on these data (called backdoor model in Figures). Please see Fig. 2.
3.1 Experiment I
Adversarial backdoor attacks were planted over four different source-target pairs: 8 → 9, 0 → 3,
4 → 7, and 2 → 5. Sample images, augmented images with the adversarial patches, confusion
matrices of the backdoor models on pristine and poisoned testing sets, as well as mean digit images
are shown in Fig. 2. Both clean and backdoor models perform very well above 95%. Applying the
backdoor model to the pristine testing sets everything looks normal and confusion matrices resemble
those of the clean model. However, when evaluated on a testing set with all source images poisoned
and relabeled with the target category, almost all of those images are now classified as the target class
(the top right matrix in each panel of Fig. 2).
Fig. 3 shows the results of applying algorithm I to the models for the 8→ 9 attack using blank images
as input to FGSM. A single image is iteratively modified to be categorized as the target class. Two
observations can be made here. First, bias maps resemble the digits, and second, the trigger at the
top-right corner of the bias map of category 9 is highlighted. The same region is off for the clean
model. The bias maps of other categories are similar across clean and attacked models. Expectedly, I
found that bias maps for the clean models do not change much across the experiments. I also found
that moderate values for  leads to better results.
Results using data and white noise inputs for the 8→ 9 are shown in Fig 4. Bias maps look more
enticing now especially using data as input and with small  = 0.1. Again, maps look more or less
similar across unaffected categories. Similar results over other attacks are observed as shown in Fig. 5
for 0→ 3, Fig. 6 for 4→ 7, and Fig. 7 for 2→ 5 attacks.
3Do not confuse this with the category in which images are perturbed.
3
Visual inspection works but is not feasible when number of categories is high. Is it possible to devise
some quantitative measures? To this end, I computed the Euclidean distance between the bias maps of
backdoor and clean models. Results are shown in Fig. 8. Interestingly, the difference curves peak at
either the source or target categories. I expect even better results using higher number of adversarial
examples. Here, I only generated 1000 examples per category.
Bias maps in Algorithm I only reveal the target category. Lets see if Algorithm II can reveal both
source and target categories. Results are shown in Figs 9, 10, 11, and 12. Please look at the Figs 9
(8→ 9) as an example. Rows and columns in this figure correspond to source and target categories,
respectively. Perturbing images, noise or data, not to belong to any source category but 9, highlights
the C-shaped adversarial patch (the right most columns). This makes sense since activating this region
increases the probability of class 9. With the same token, perturbing images not to be 8 sometimes
highlights the patch region. This is perhaps due to the optimization procedure that aims to lower the
probability of 8 while at the same time increasing the probability of the target class. Nonetheless,
looking across rows and columns reveals which source category has been attacked to become which
target category.
3.2 Experiment II
Adversarial patches in experiment one were confined to a fixed spatial region. Here, I will choose
random locations to place the patch. Attempts were made not to occlude the digits (i.e. blank regions
were selected). Results are shown in Fig. 13 for the 8→ 9 attack. Inspecting the bias map for digit 9
shows C-shaped patterns all over the map. Again, results will likely improve with more number of
samples per category, since number of possible locations for the patch are now higher compared to
the first experiment. Quantitative results are shown in Fig. 17. Bar charts are spikier now compared
to Fig. 8 but still in some cases reveal the impacted categories. Please see Figs. 14, 15, and 16 for
results over other attacks.
3.3 Experiment III
In general, detecting backdoor attacks can be a very daunting task. The adversary may not need to
obtain 100% accuracy for the attack which entails that he can try until he gets a hit (unless there is a
limit on the number of attempts). Further, the adversary may add minute perturbations to balance
between attack accuracy and the chance of the attack being compromised. My aim in this experiment
is to study whether the proposed methods can highlight less perceptible adversarial patches such as
multiplying the digit image by 2 (Fig. 18) or blending the source image with a randomly selected
image from the target category, here Isource + 0.1× Itarget (Fig. 19)4.
Sample images and perturbations are presented for the 8→ 9 attack in Figs. 18 and 19. As confusion
matrices in these figures illustrate, only a tiny fraction of the poisoned images are now classified
under the target category. Even the average digit maps here look quite normal. Thus, this type of
perturbation can be a serious challenge for any backdoor defense method.
Qualitative results are shown in Figs. 20 and 21. Although not very clear, it seems there is a
bigger difference over bias maps for digit 9 compared to other digits. Quantitative results in Fig. 22
corroborate this observation. Admittedly though, I think this needs further investigation.
4 Discussion
I proposed a simple method to examine a model that might have been attacked. This method can
be considered as a system identification method. With no information about a model other than
output labels, one strategy is to feed white noise input to the system and analyze the statistics of
noise in different categories. This is what we did in [13]. The drawback however is the demand for
a large number of queries. Here, assuming the model is white-box, I was able to lower the sample
complexity dramatically. For example, for 10 categories and 1000 samples per category, 10,000
samples are needed in total, whereas in [13] we used samples in the order of millions. Also, the
introduced methods are much more efficient.
4Notice that in general, it is also possible to transform the entire images by transformations such as small
rotation, blurring, adding noise, or adding physical objects such as adversarial glasses.
4
The proposed method differs from the existing backdoor attack detection works which often rely on
statistical analysis of the poisoned training dataset (e.g. [14, 15]) or the neural activations in different
layers (e.g. [16]). Here instead, I derived the biases of the networks. It is possible to improve upon
the presented results by performing analysis over the individual adversarial examples in addition to
the mean maps.
The preliminary results here without fine tuning or regularization (as is done in these types of works
e.g. DeepDream) are promising. However, further effort is needed to scale up this method over
datasets containing natural scenes such as CIFAR or ImageNet.
Lastly, I wonder whether these methods can be used in neuroscience to understand feature selec-
tivity of neurons or perceptual biases in humans, similar to [17]. The current work also relates to
neuropsychology and category learning research.
Acknowledgement. I would like to thank Google for making the Colaboratory platform available.
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Figure 3: Bias maps derived using blank inputs to the Algorithm I for the 8→ 9 attack. Plots are in pairs corresponding to the
attacked and clean models, respectively. Results are shown for 10 (first two rows), 30 (second two rows), and 100 iterations of the
FGSM attack using one blank image and =0.1. The bottom rows show the results with 100 samples, 10 iterations and =0.1.
Increasing the number of samples does change the outcome. Image titles show the percentage of the images that are classified
under a particular class. Notice, however, that bias maps are all computed for the images that fall under a certain category.
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Using data
Using noise
Figure 4: Bias maps derived by feeding data (top) and white noise (bottom) to Algorithm I, for the 8→ 9 attack. In each panel,
pairs from top to bottom correspond to  equal to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, respectively. Number of samples and iterations were set to
1000, 10, respectively.
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Using data
Using noise
Figure 5: Bias maps derived by feeding data (top) and white noise (bottom) to Algorithm I, for the 0→ 3 attack. In each panel,
pairs from top to bottom correspond to  equal to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, respectively. Number of samples and iterations were set to
1000, 10, respectively.
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Using data
Using noise
Figure 6: Bias maps derived by feeding data (top) and white noise (bottom) to Algorithm I, for the 4→ 7 attack. In each panel,
pairs from top to bottom correspond to  equal to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, respectively. Number of samples and iterations were set to
1000, 10, respectively.
9
Using data
Using noise
Figure 7: Bias maps derived by feeding data (top) and white noise (bottom) to Algorithm I, for the 2→ 5 attack. In each panel,
pairs from top to bottom correspond to  equal to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, respectively. Number of samples and iterations were set to
1000, 10, respectively.
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Figure 8: Quantitative performance of Algorithm I in detecting the backdoor attacks in experiment one.
Columns from left to right correspond to 8→ 9, 0→ 3, 4→ 7, and 2→ 5 attacks.
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Figure 9: Bias maps over pairs of (source,target) categories using data (top row) and white noise (bottom row)
inputs. Columns correspond to the backdoor (left) and the clean (right) models. This result is for the 8→ 9 attack.
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Figure 10: Bias maps over pairs of (source,target) categories using data (top row) and white noise (bottom row)
inputs. Columns correspond to the backdoor (left) and the clean (right) models. This result is for the 0→ 3 attack.
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Figure 11: Bias maps over pairs of (source,target) categories using data (top row) and white noise (bottom row)
inputs. Columns correspond to the backdoor (left) and the clean (right) models. This result is for the 4→ 7 attack.
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Figure 12: Bias maps over pairs of (source,target) categories using data (top row) and white noise (bottom row)
inputs. Columns correspond to the backdoor (left) and the clean (right) models. This result is for the 2→ 5 attack.
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Using data
Using noise
Figure 13: Bias maps derived by feeding data (top) and white noise (bottom) to Algorithm I, for the 8→ 9 attack. In each panel,
pairs from top to bottom correspond to  equal to 0.1 and 0.5 respectively. Number of samples and iterations were set to 1000 and
10, respectively. Adversarial patches were placed at random locations.
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Using data
Using noise
Figure 14: Bias maps derived by feeding data (top) and white noise (bottom) to Algorithm I, for the 0→ 3 attack. In each panel,
pairs from top to bottom correspond to  equal to 0.1 and 0.5 respectively. Number of samples and iterations were set to 1000 and
10, respectively. Adversarial patches were placed at random locations.
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Using data
Using noise
Figure 15: Bias maps derived by feeding data (top) and white noise (bottom) to Algorithm I, for the 4→ 7 attack. In each panel,
pairs from top to bottom correspond to  equal to 0.1 and 0.5 respectively. Number of samples and iterations were set to 1000 and
10, respectively. Adversarial patches were placed at random locations.
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Using data
Using noise
Figure 16: Bias maps derived by feeding data (top) and white noise (bottom) to Algorithm I, for the 2→ 5 attack. In each panel,
pairs from top to bottom correspond to  equal to 0.1 and 0.5 respectively. Number of samples and iterations were set to 1000 and
10, respectively. Adversarial patches were placed at random locations.
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Figure 17: Quantitative performance of Algorithm I in detecting the backdoor attacks in experiment two. Columns from left to
right correspond to
8→ 9, 0→ 3, 4→ 7, and 2→ 5 attacks. Adversarial patches were placed at random locations.
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Figure 18: Illustration of the multiplication backdoor attack. A sample image and its corresponding
poisoned image, confusion matrices over the pristine testing dataset and the poisoned dataset, as well
as the average digit maps are shown.
Figure 19: Illustration of the blending backdoor attack. A sample image and its corresponding
poisoned image, confusion matrices over the pristine testing dataset and the poisoned dataset, as well
as the average digit maps are shown.
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Using blank image
Using data
Using noise
Figure 20: Bias maps using blank (1 sample, and 100 iterations), data, and white noise inputs (100 samples and 10 iterations) for
the 8→ 9 multiplication backdoor attack. In each panel, paired rows correspond to  equal to 0.1 and .5, respectively.
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Using blank image
Using data
Using noise
Figure 21: Bias maps using blank (1 sample, and 100 iterations), data, and white noise inputs (1000 samples and 10 iterations) for
the 8→ 9 blending backdoor attack. In each panel, paired rows correspond to  equal to 0.1 and .5, respectively.
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Figure 22: Quantitative performance of Algorithm I in detecting the multiplication (top) and blending
(bottom) backdoor attacks (experiment three).
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Figure 23: CNN architecture used for MNIST classification.
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